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
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP**

14 APRIL THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962

**Task Force W
Foreign
Intelligence
Branch**

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III. WHAT TARGETS WAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND WITH WHAT FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY?

The following remarks apply to agent coverage only, that is, coverage by means of individuals on the island of Cuba, or elsewhere in the world. Audio devices or telephone taps on Cuban installations abroad or Cubans living abroad have produced intelligence which has served operational ends, in other words, information which has provided critical data used in the spotting, assessment and recruitment of agents. Due to the standard security measures taken in most official installations, these technical operations have been able to provide only a limited amount of positive intelligence. In general, agents have produced information essentially in accordance with their known access at the time of recruitment. Responsibility for many of the agents dealt with during the present reporting period was simply assumed by TFW from past efforts against Cuba. In many instances, these agents had been recruited strictly on an "availability" basis, and indeed had no particular access. A major effort was made at the inception of TFW to winnow out those persons who could make no contribution and to redirect those who could. This process of redirection, which was conducted via time consuming and generally inefficient S/W channels, resulted in the conversion of a number of heretofore unusable agents into sound, pertinent reporting sources. Though, in most instances, TFW operations officers had never had personal contact with these agents, they succeeded in inducing many of them to spot, develop and recruit sub-agents. This technique succeeded, despite the obstacles involved in vetting candidates and advising agents via S/W means. In regard to the recruitment of new agent assets during the reporting period, TFW was able to be guided by specific, priority needs. Accordingly, the many new assets acquired were chosen because of specific access to target personalities or institutions. The assigned targets and extent of coverage are indicated below.

A. Military

During the reporting period, in the latter half, the Agency's major effort to obtain intelligence from agent sources, centered on Cuban military affairs. The reporting obtained covered matters ranging from military policy to detailed OB. Almost every agent contributed to this effort, with the consequence that the coverage of military matters was wide-spread and continuous. Despite the fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W (much of it from totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience), such was the detail and volume of the data, that our agents were able to give us highly significant information on troop and materiel movements, location and nature of military sites, etc. The following agents served as the major sources of military information during the reporting period:

1. Cuban (insurance⁰⁸) executive, who had a large and diversified net, provided intelligence in late June 1962 which specifically anticipated the massive Soviet military build-up which ultimately took place in Cuba. Throughout the build-up itself this agent provided an almost continuous stream of OB intelligence on missile, maritime and air phases of the build-up. He provided the initial reporting on delivery of IL-28's to the island.

2. A relative of a former Cuban president whose government connections provided him on several occasions with information on attitudes of various military factions toward Castro and the Soviets. Agent also provided some detailed missile OB.

3. (U.S. citizen⁰⁶) who established contact with a resistance chief (in Pinar del Rio) during July 1962, provided, in the course of several reports,¹⁰ an inventory of Soviet installations throughout the province. The maintenance of communication with this agent was extremely arduous in virtue of his most exposed position.

4. A Havana (surgeon⁰⁸) who took special horseback trips to cover the Soviet installation at Torrens Reformatory.

5. A former lawyer, resident of Santiago provided information on Cuban army~~mmmm~~ laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as on Soviet troops and materiel movements.

6. A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet-occupied hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements in the Havana area.

7. A Cubana official who provided comprehensive data on state readiness of Cubana air materiel.

8. A merchant in Camaguey who had provided general observational reporting on military activities in his area.

9. A former wife of a Cuba Airlines pilot who has contacts among Cuban Airline pilots from whom she obtained some air OB.

10. A shipping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported sporadically on activities at the port.

11. A construction company employee at Guantanamo Naval Base reported on Cuban OB in the environs of the base.

12. A public accountant in Havana who is the leader of a counter-revolutionary group, reported military information acquired through his group contacts.

13. A Havana bartender who reported considerable quantities of OB data obtained from his large circle of varied acquaintances in Havana area.

14. A retired railroad official reported data on rail shipments.

15. A lawyer in Havana reported on Rancho Boyeros Airport in Havana where (a certain airline) is one of his clients.

16. A (pineapple) firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited in July 1962 reported on military developments in his area.

17. A Cuban employee of a foreign embassy recruited in July 1962 in Havana reported some OB information which was obtained through casual contacts.

18. A customs inspector (at Jose Marti Airport) in Havana was the source of good reporting on Sov/Bloc cargo shipments to Havana, including military cargos.

19. A physician in Havana who reported on military movements.

20. A Cuban Airlines official, with limited access, reported Air OB.

21. A foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana reported military OB.

22. A second foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana reported military OB.

23. A number of maritime assets who have reported on Sov/Bloc military cargo deliveries to Cuba.

b. Political. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency was able to produce intelligence on Cuban political affairs at the ministerial level and above. This intelligence was derived essentially from sources who had but limited access to persons of high rank or in key positions. This type of access placed a premium on Agent elicitation skills and the ability to distinguish between rumor and fact, plus an aptitude for remaining afloat in dangerous waters. The most significant political information was provided by the following agents:

1. An official (in the Ministry of Economics) who, (in the capacity of advisor to Ernesto GUEVARA) was able to glean information on Cuban political affairs.

2. A relative of a former Cuban president who through this connection and his own social position is able to maintain contact with high-level officials in Cuba.

3. A Cuban doctor (who gives medical treatment to Cuban officials and) who is reporting limited intelligence, by direction, until he is able to develop direct access to important high-level officials.

4. ⁰⁸ (A cultural) attache of a West European Embassy in Havana who picks up information from other diplomats and from Cuban contacts on political matters. A sub-agent of this asset has also been a source of medium-level political information.
5. A West European Ambassador in Cuba who provides political information he obtains from foreign and Cuban contacts.
6. A ⁰⁸ (Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe) who has been reporting with utmost detail and frequency on high-level political matters of which he is aware.
7. The Ambassador to Cuba of a Latin American country who reports political intelligence obtained through his Cuban and foreign contacts.
8. A former protege ⁰⁶ (of Raul CASTRO) who retains contacts with government leaders and who is a new asset developing his reporting capabilities on political matters.
9. The Ambassador in Cuba of ¹⁰ (a North African) country who has provided high-level political information.
10. A Cuban lawyer in Santiago whose brother-in-law, ⁰⁸ (a high-ranking official) provided intelligence on GOC/Soviet relations.
- ²⁴ 11. A staff officer of a foreign intelligence service assigned (to a cover position) in a Havana Embassy who has produced some political intelligence responsive to our requirements.
12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting has covered general political developments.
13. ⁰⁸ (A librarian and teacher who is a relative of a ⁰⁸ (former justice) of the Cuban Supreme Court) and who has high-level government contacts. This agent has been reporting political personality data and some political information.
14. A ⁰⁸ (Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe) who has reported political information to which he has access.
15. In addition, there are a number of agent penetrations in Cuban diplomatic establishments overseas who provide a variety of miscellaneous political information concerning Cuban activities in the areas concerned.

c. Economic. The Agency was able to produce a continuous amount of intelligence from Agent sources on the Cuban sugar, oil and transportation industries, much of which was in the form of statistical summaries. In a number of instances, this intelligence was provided by agents who had direct access to this information by virtue of their jobs. We also have been able to get continued reporting on general economic conditions and foreign trade. Among the most significant agents reporting economic information were:

1. A Cuban (insurance) salesman, previously noted, who through his extensive contacts and sub-agents has been able to provide information on sugar production, (insurance) affairs and the Cuban banking system.

2. An official of the (Ministry of Economy), (a close associate of Che GUEVARA), who has provided useful economic intelligence.

3. A relative of a former Cuban president, previously noted, who has provided detailed import-export figures; detailed documentary reports on petroleum.

4. (A high-level) official of Cubana Airlines who reportedly provided high-level information on Cubana Airlines, particularly financial and materiel affairs.

5. A resident of Mexico and (director of an Italian-controlled pharmaceutical) firm who travels to Cuba where he has good contacts in the Ministry of Industry, who has reported economic information.

6. A Dutch businessman who has access to Cuban economic officials and who has provided useful economic information.

7. U.S. trained Cuban engineer who provided detailed reports on (petroleum) industry.

d. Sociological and General Conditions. The Agency has provided a steady and relatively heavy flow of intelligence covering such matters as the state of resistance activities, mood of the populace, living conditions, etc., from agents in nearly every Cuban province. A survey of agents reporting this type of information has not been completed, because almost all of our agents have reported on this low priority topic from time to time.

4. Within the Terms of the Agency's Mission, What Target Was It Unable to Cover and Why?

a. Paragraph 3 above sets forth in general the degree to which the major Cuban targets were covered during the reporting

period. The key military, political and economic targets were clearly defined and assiduously pursued by TFW. The immense pressure of time must continuously be borne in mind if the attack on the Cuban problem is to be granted its full perspective. Even before TFW assumed responsibility for collection against Cuba, it was clear that intelligence on Soviet, Satellite and Chinese Communist Cuban policy and maneuvers would be formulated and planned at the highest level in the respective governments. Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine search for insights into the Cuban policies of these governments would enjoy only as much success as the clandestine search for any intelligence regarding any policies of these governments. Time restrictions alone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of these key denied area targets could be achieved. As a consequence, every facet of the TFW collection program was geared to the search for top priority Cuban intelligence; from sources in the free world and on the island every agent or agent candidate was evaluated in terms of his access to such intelligence. Translated into espionage terms, this meant that every agent or candidate was examined sharply to determine whether and how he could help penetrate the GOC, the Cuban armed forces or the managerial and policy levels of the Cuban economy. Below is an account of the success of this effort; it will be seen that most major target areas were under direct, specific assault.

b. Political.

1. Cuban Communist Party:⁶ In late May a close relative and confidant (of the Chief of the Cuban Communist Party) was singled out and developed by a Cuban principle agent. The candidate provided highly valuable information throughout the summer of 1962. Though the information was obtained indirectly by the agent it was but a portion of what he could produce. Thus the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate's direct recruitment. The drive toward this goal continues, and though we are optimistic that the 6 months effort thus far invested will result in the direct recruitment of a high-level (Communist Party) member, it would be inaccurate to say that as of the close of the reporting period, the (Party) had been penetrated at a significant level. 29

2. GOC Ruling Circle.

(a) In May 1962 TFW spotted a Cuban legal traveller whose brother-in-law has been a member of the GOC from its inception. The agent was recruited under specific instructions to attempt to induce his relative to report on GOC policy matters. Though TFW had only 12 hours with the agent

before dispatching him to Cuba, he has attempted to carry out his instructions. By October he had succeeded in eliciting significant information from the target, and was confident his full recruitment was simply a matter of time. One inhibiting feature affecting the pace of this operation is the fact that the agent lives in Santiago while his relative, the target, is a resident of Havana. Unquestionably the full recruitment of the target could help fill an important gap in our reporting on GOC activities.

(b) In June 1962 TFW obtained a lead to a person very closely related to Fidel CASTRO. Throughout the summer extensive but necessarily circumspect negotiations were conducted to bring this person to Mexico where full recruitment, training and briefing would be possible. The negotiations culminated in success. The agent was met and trained by Agency personnel in September and early October and dispatched to Cuba on 15 October with the specific mission of reporting on the thoughts, plans and activities of the CASTROS and other leading GOC figures. Since the target, prior to recruitment did not possess the kind of political awareness which would have led him systematically to observe those GOC personalities to whom he had natural access, the Agency was denied any prime political intelligence from this source during the reporting period. *James*

(c) Throughout the summer 1962, TFW received various reports, the tenor of which were that Ernesto 'Che' GUEVARA would like to defect from Cuba. Each report proved, upon closer inquiry, to be groundless, until we learned in late September that a Mexican industrialist had claimed GUEVARA had asked him in 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba. Though many of the facets of this disclosure tallied with other known data, exploitation of this exceedingly important lead was hamstrung by the inability to align a qualified agency officer with the widely travelling Mexican. This lead illustrates well the frustrations involved in pursuing high-level targets within a rigid time framework, and with a limited number of available personnel. It also illustrated the need to persist, when the target is of sufficient importance, in the follow up of "far-out" leads.

3. Military

(a). In late July TFW recruited a Cuban legal traveller expressly because of his close relationship with a member of the Cuban General Staff.⁰⁶ Once again only a few hours was available in which to train the agent. Nevertheless, during August, September and October the agent persisted in his efforts

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to develop the target and was able to provide significant OB at the same time. Neither this, nor the other efforts to penetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had met with full success by the end of the reports period.

⁰⁶ (b) The Cuban lawyer recruited in May 1962 (see paragraph 2a above) developed a second target in September, a former member (of the Cuban General Staff) now awaiting reassignment. The agent was instructed to recruit and train this military Officer in S/W. At the end of the reporting period it was not possible to determine the success of this potentially excellent operational development.

(c) Included in this discussion is the partially successful recruitment of a Cuban army engineer who is stationed in Santiago. The agent cited in (2b above) has been in contact with this target, a captain, since July 1962, but has not succeeded in completing the full recruitment. He has obtained OB from the captain, but we feel the operation will not have reached its full potential until the captain has been trained in S/W and is reporting directly to us.

(d) Since mid-August the Agency has been pursuing a lead to the G-3 of the Cuban Army. The basis of this pursuit was fitted together from innumerable reports, and finally centered, in early October, on a plan to try to effect the recruitment using a letter from a former army and prison comrade. By cut-off data, the developmental activity had reached the point where the only remaining matter was to deliver the letter into the hands of the Officer.

3. Economic. The Agency has striven to identify key figures in the Cuban economy and to develop assess to them as rapidly as possible, wherever the opportunity has arisen. Oil, Nickle and Sugar Industries have been assigned to us having the highest priority.

(a) Petroleum:⁰⁸ TFW recruited and sent to Cuba in January a young (U.S. trained) engineer. In (May) ⁰⁹ he reported he had obtained a position in the (Institute of Petroleum)²⁴ Too lowly himself to be of major value, we have steadily guided him ²⁴ in an enterprise aimed at recruitment of the (chief of the petroleum) industry. The families of the two man had been close friends. The effort involves many imponderables and must be carried out via S/W. Still, the major aim is deemed worthy of the investment. Meanwhile the agent has been able to provide intelligence of increasing value.

(b) Nickle Industry: The seat of this important industry unfortunately is in two small towns in Oriente province. Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importance always pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns are no exception. Numerous well-meaning persons in the U.S. have attempted to help us obtain access to this critical target. Yet not until late September was the Agency able to turn up (by virtue of a New Orleans recruitment) a source of viable leads to key personnel. By cut-off date, however, we had not been able to bring any lead to function. Most promising is a lead to the (technical supervisor) of the Nickle complex.

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(c) Sugar: Two former high-level penetrations of the Sugar Industry defected to the U.S. soon after the inception of TFW. Throughout the summer it was not possible to identify a suitable candidate to replace them. A New York source in early October succeeded in placing us in touch with the (chief sugar 08 technician) in Cuba. This operation should be fully productive by Christmas 1962.

To illustrate the results of this operational data, we have recently been preparing the recruitment in place or defection of one of the principal officers of the Cuban Foreign Service in Europe. We have been able to develop the proposals through an already defected diplomat and the effectiveness of his approach and a reading on the diplomats reactions can be provided to us independently by three other agents in close contact with him as well as through a technical surveillance operation.

G. Liaison

The most fruitful¹⁰ liaison relative to the Cuban target has been conducted with (European) and a few of the (Latin American)¹⁰ services. Specifically, the following services have been the most cooperative and helpful: The (British), (Dutch), (French), (Spanish), (Italian), (Greek), (Norwegian), (Danish), (West German), (Mexican), (Argentinian), (Uruguayan), (Canadian) and (Chilean).

Some of these services are working closely with the Task Force both in Washington and Miami, cutting corners on procedure, protocol and actually exceeding their own official instructions. This has been particularly true after the announcement of the President on 22 October 1962. The degree of this effort is remarkable and runs all the way from full cooperation to an outstanding exertion of personal commitment, resourcefulness, and imagination to find ways to help our effort.

To cite only a few of the current FI operations developed through liaison services, the (Spanish) service has given us²⁴ 4 resident agents (including 2 diplomats)²⁴. The (French) service has provided us with one (resident diplomat) who communicates directly with us (by W/T)²⁴. The (Danish) and (Dutch) services, have given us control of (maritime assets calling at Cuban ports), and they have also participated in joint²⁴ operations using (legal travellers)²⁴. In addition to mounting²⁴ operations against Cuba, several (European)¹⁰ services have provided (secure diplomatic courier) services for the transmittal of our own²⁴ (agents' communications) and for the (infil-²⁴ tration of S/W and W/T and other materials) to our agents inside Cuba. Services in (Belgium) and (Holland) have been particularly helpful in the development of an operation to deny Cuba (access)²⁴ to an²⁴ (urgently needed solvent for petroleum products). To date it appears that efforts to make this (product unobtainable) to the Cubans has been successful.²⁴

In general, the (West European)¹⁰ services have been cooperative in assisting us to mount operations against Cuba and against installations in their own territory.¹⁰ (Latin American) services, have been most helpful in developing operations against Cuban targets in their own countries, apparently because of the (Latin¹⁰ Americans') increasing concern with the threat of Cuban subversion on their territory.

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V. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE PERIOD.

The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to increase and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capability was to establish a Cuban Task Force at Headquarters and to staff it with experienced intelligence officers. These officers were selected from other operating Divisions within the Agency. Many of them spoke Spanish and all of them have had extensive experience in various intelligence assignments both at Headquarters and in the Field. This newly created Task Force was charged with the responsibility to direct, advise, support, and/or coordinate all phases of the Agency's intelligence operations directed against Cuba.

At the same time, the Task Force Field Station in Miami was strengthened considerably with increased numbers of experienced staff officers and facilities for mounting intelligence operations against the Cuban target. This concentration of experienced personnel into the Cuban Task Force, both at Headquarters and at the Miami Field Station, was a positive and significant effort to increase the Agency's intelligence coverage capability in order to satisfactorily fulfill the priority requirements and tasks which had been levied on the Agency as a result of the Communist takeover in Cuba.

To further improve our coverage capability, the Agency communications office set up a special facility in Miami to (intercept electronically internal communications) within Cuba. These (intercepted communications) are processed in Miami and then forwarded directly to Headquarters, Miami Field Station, (and to NSA for action and/or further dissemination). The (NSA) disseminates to the other members of the intelligence community the information that has been intercepted and processed by this special Agency communication facility. This facility cooperates and coordinates its operations closely with (NSA) and is used (by NSA) to assist in the (interception) of (internal communications) in Cuba. ²⁴

In addition to setting up within the Agency an organization whose primary mission is concerned with all phases of intelligence operations directed against Cuba, all other operating Divisions within the Agency were directed to give top priority attention to the development of intelligence operations against Cuba. This has resulted in the diversion of certain assets who had the requisite access to Cuban targets as well as the experience or capability.

The response of the various Agency components, both by Headquarters Desks and by the Field Stations, has been most satisfactory and has aided the Task Force considerably in the performance of its assigned mission. Within the Task Force, selected officers have been designated to assist, advise, and coordinate on all phases of Cuban intelligence operations with the various geographic division desks. This arrangement has provided for a continued, increased coverage capability of the Cuban target by insuring a regular review of current, developmental, and planned intelligence operations of all available Agency intelligence assets which could be directed against Cuba.

The above points are ones that reflect significant changes which have taken place during this period. In addition, it should be pointed out that there has been an intensification and concentration of all operational techniques applicable to the particular type and character of the Cuban target. There has been a substantial increase in the recruitment and training of agent assets. There has been an extensive increase in the establishment and use of clandestine communications methods and channels. The use of SW, one way voice radio, and WT as methods of communicating with agents inside Cuba has been greatly expanded. And since certain (Western Nations) still maintain Embassies in Havana, (courier) channels for the delivery (of letters and packages) ²⁴ by the (diplomatic pouch) have been developed and are being used extensively. ²⁴ The above points are discussed elsewhere in this paper but they are mentioned here briefly in the context of being closely related to significant changes in the Agency's intelligence capability.

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VI. WHAT SUPPORT FOR COLLECTION FACILITIES-WAS REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES? HOW WAS IT SECURED FROM THEM? WAS IT TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS LACKING?

The conduct of intelligence collection operations often has depended on timely and effective support from other U.S. government agencies. Several government agencies provided support to intelligence operations directed against the Cuban target on both a regular and a standby basis. In fact, each and every request for policy approved support was granted and carried out rapidly and effectively. For example, the Department of State has expedited the issuance of visas on selected cases at our request as well as granting visa waivers to individuals of operational interest to the Agency. In addition, Foreign Service personnel interview, debrief, and attempt to establish the bona-fides of potential intelligence assets who voluntarily contact a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. This is often done alone and some times in collaboration with an agency officer prior to introducing the agency officer for further development and exploitation as the case may require. These types of support are provided regularly by the Department of State and contribute considerably to the effectiveness of many complex intelligence operations.

Another U.S. government agency which has given invaluable support to the Agency's intelligence collection operations is the FBI. The FBI has provided biographic data, investigative reports, and operational leads to individuals of known or potential operational interest. This support has been maintained on a regular and continuing basis. Close liaison relations between the FBI and this agency are maintained at Headquarters and at various Field Stations. This close liaison has resulted in a better understanding of the needs and requirements of each Agency in the successful accomplishments of their separate responsibilities as well as providing a rapid channel for providing support and assistance when requested.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has facilitated the entry into the U.S. of persons of operational interest to the Agency; and has provided guidance and support for cases which involve unusual alien residence and/or naturalization proceedings. Liaison with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is particularly close and harmonious at the Miami Field installation where the bulk of the cases involving persons of operational interest to us originates.

Reports provided on a regular basis by the National Security Agency have been a source of operational leads which have been followed

up for²⁹ the development of collection assets. The disseminations by the (N.S.A) also serve as an effective means of checking selected information and activity that has been provided by other sources of information. The (NSA) also collaborates in the⁴ dissemination of certain information with the CIA (communication facility) in Miami, an Agency unit engaged in the (electronic interception) and processing of Cuban (Internal Communications).²⁴

Liaison with the aforementioned U.S. government agencies is maintained on a continuing and regular basis both at the Headquarters level in Washington, D.C. and at appropriate field installations by designated Agency components. It has been our pleasurable experience that these agencies, in addition to others such as the Department of Agriculture where specific operations required guidance in their particular fields of competence, have provided timely, effective, and professional support and guidance, in support of policy approved intelligence collection operations as required in the national interest. Without such support, the task of intelligence collection would have been in many instances much more difficult and, in many cases, impossible

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VII. AGENT SUMMARIES

The scope and nature of the Agency's Foreign Intelligence operations is most clearly seen in the character, personal ambition and caprice of the human material present, namely the agents involved. The following sketches of the individual agents engaged in these operations have been compiled in recognition of the vital ingredient which these human beings bring to an appreciation of the Agency's FI operations. It will be noted that a majority of the agents work, or have been worked, out of Miami, the city which has been the center of anti-Castro Cubans, the major pool of potential agents, since 1959.

Other geographical areas are represented in mathematical sequence, in fact according to the number of Cuban exiles in residence at a given place. This same mathematical order applies with reference to the jobs these agents hold. Thus, if a Cuban has a function, the performance of which is important in sustaining the island, hence important to the Cuban Regime, the Agency has sought the services of this man as its agent.²⁴ For this reason, several agents are in the employ of the (airlines) and of (merchant²⁴ marine shipping) businesses. So too, with diplomacy. Every foreign diplomat now accredited to the Regime in Havana has been examined by the Agency as a prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplomats were approached. Of this number about one half took our bait and have accepted assignments which range from marginal involvement in "intelligence" (e.g., using their diplomatic immunity to carry our materials), to active participation in our operations.

Finally, one type of Cuban who played an influential, though limited, role during the past six months was the defector (who is not mentioned elsewhere in this paper). The defector is the official who for one reason or another cannot remain in or be persuaded to remain in place and report on his job. Owing to the nature of this particular person, it is difficult to draw hard lines between those who genuinely reject their Government and those who merely quit in self-interest, but during the past six months, the Agency tapped in on the defections of about ten Cubans of consequence, profiting from their information in all cases and from their psychological exploitation when circumstance would permit.